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Between System and Poetics: 
William Desmond and Philosophy 
after Dialectic. Edited by Thomas 
A.F. Kelly. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. 
Pp. xi+307. Price £60.00 (hbk). ISBN 
978-0-7546-5206-9.
This collection of 18 essays is the 
‘first book-length examination of the 
work of an important contemporary 
thinker in the continental tradition, 
William Desmond’ (p. i). It takes its 
title, in part, from Desmond’s own essay, 
‘Between System and Poetics: On the 
Practices of Philosophy’ (Chapter 2), 
which comprises Part I of the book, 
entitled ‘Desmond on Philosophy.’ Parts 
II ‘Desmond and Irish Philosophy,’ III 
‘Reading Desmond,’ IV ‘Desmond and 
Metaphysics,’ V ‘Desmond, Love and 
the Good,’ VI ‘Desmond on Eros,’ VII 
‘Desmond and God,’ VIII ‘Reading with 
Desmond,’ and IX ‘Desmond, Science, 
the Arts and the Environment,’ con-
tain a further 16 essays, assiduously 
arranged by the editor under the afore-
mentioned headings, and that were 
written either by former students of his, 
fellow colleagues, the director of his 
Master’s thesis (Garrett Barden, of Uni -
versity College Cork), or by those 
par ti cularly interested in Desmond’s 
contribution to philosophical thought. 
The diversity of the collection of 
articles in itself is testimony to the 
fecundity of Desmond’s own project in 
philosophy. The collection is edited by 
the late Professor Thomas A.F. Kelly of 
the Department of Philosophy at NUI 
Maynooth, then Senior Lecturer in 
the Department, and who also prefaces 
the book with Chapter 1, aptly 
titled, ‘Introduction.’ And as with all 
introductions to books, introductions 
should be read last, and commented on 
last—more of the editor’s contribution 
later.
The topic of this book is both Des-
mond’s understanding of philosophy, in 
particular his practice of philosophy, 
and other thinkers’ critical engagement 
with that practice or efforts to advance 
some of his ideas. Therein the unity of 
the book holds. This is not a book for 
philosophers, therefore, but a book of 
philosophy. And as Desmond is well 
aware—and as others in this com-
pendium are equally aware, and maybe 
because of him—philosophy is a most 
curious, if not most peculiarly, self-
reflexive discipline in that doing phil-
osophy necessarily contains, at least 
implicitly, a philosophy of philosophy 
in its very doing (whereas doing mathe-
matics, for instance, does not contain 
a mathematics of mathematics, etc.). 
Not all philosophers, therefore, would 
or could agree with the philosophy 
ex pressed between the covers of this 
book—philosophy being a product 
of human life experiences and 
human creativity being what it is, a 
point never lost to Desmond or by 
Desmond—but, then, Desmond would 
not agree with all of the philosophy 
that has been expressed between 
the covers of those books written by 
Hegel and Nietzsche, and that have 
come down to us to influence the 
two main philosophic traditions that 
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are represented respectively by the 
twin pillars of ‘system’ and ‘poetics.’ 
In this regard, Desmond’s philosophy 
is both historically and philosophically 
precisely locatable: it comes after 
Hegel and Nietzsche historically, and 
it comes after their manners of thinking 
philosophically; but, unlike Hegel and 
Nietzsche, Desmond thinks the sys-
tem of poetics and the poetics of system 
from a ‘metaxological’ point of view, 
some thing that neither of these two 
thinkers on their own did, nor their 
following traditions can. Therein lies 
the challenge of Desmond’s thought, 
a challenge admirably taken up by 
all the contributors in this collection, 
including Desmond himself. 
This is not to suggest, however, 
that Desmond offers to those who 
come after him (both historically 
and philosophically) a way of doing 
philosophy for difference’s sake; rather, 
the stakes are much higher, for, if 
Desmond is right about what he is 
doing, and I believe he is, what he 
is attempting to do is to offer another 
way of doing philosophy for phil-
osophy’s sake, one that approaches 
the be tween (metaxu) of system and 
poetics, but which remains both stead-
fastly ‘systematic’ (pp. 20–2) and ‘a 
singing thought’ (p. 29) [think of the 
Latin ‘cantare’ (to sing) a poem].  We 
must understand the term ‘poetics,’ 
however, in the strong Aristotelian 
sense of poesis, that is, of the on-going 
activity of bringing something into 
existence, not of nature, but of the 
human beings’ makings, i.e., ‘objects’ 
of culture, a play, a poem, a thought, 
a philosophy, a bridge, an airport, a 
computer, a mathematical theorem, 
a scientific hypothesis, etc.; hence, 
the potential depth-dimension and 
breadth-expansion of the ‘topic’ that 
Desmond addresses in his thought, 
and one that marks the diversity of the 
other contributors’ efforts too. From 
this point of view also, we can readily 
understand why ‘[T]he practice of 
philosophy,’ as Desmond avers, ‘is as 
much in the living of the thought, as in 
the life of thought’ (p. 14). Thus in this 
collection Desmond’s own particular 
essay is more than a (re-)statement 
of his own previously held and highly 
com mendable efforts towards making 
‘metaphysics’ alive in ‘the between’ of so 
many competing towers of science and 
scholarship, and that are documented 
in his many publications (see, ‘A 
Bibliography of William Desmond’s 
Works,’ pp. 293–302). His essay also 
offers his own reflective insight into his 
own position in philosophy, including 
some very telling snippets of parti-
cular experiences of his own life, his 
own academic, literary, religious and 
cultural life growing up in the Republic 
of Ireland in the 1960s, that led him 
to and beyond what his philosophy 
seeks today.  Desmond calls it ‘a call-
ing’ (p. 13). In the 1860s, some 100 
years earlier, Franz Brentano likewise 
underwent a similar experience to 
Desmond’s, regarding philosophy, and 
understood philosophy as a ‘mission,’ as 
his student, Edmund Husserl, recalls in 
his ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’ 
(1919). And this ‘sense of a mission’ 
in philosophy was passed on to many 
more (think of Heidegger, for example, 
and his 1952 lecture-course What 
Calls for Thinking?, though Heidegger 
extinguishes the particular scientific 
sense to the mission in philosophy 
engendering Brentano and Husserl’s 
thought). Unlike Desmond, however, 
Brentano had very little time for 
Hegel’s thought; the latter appeared to 
Brentano as the antithesis of science, 
as windy mysticism. But, then, not 
all philosophers are equally interested 
in other philosophers’ practices, or in 
all the branches of philosophy, and 
Brentano himself had thought that 
his so-called follower, Husserl, had 
argued against everything that he stood 
for methodologically. That Brentano 
spawned many different and various 
‘takes’ on and in philosophy (Scholastic, 
phenomenological, analytic, psycho-
analytic, and pragmatic) is remark-
able. Desmond, however, gives 
Hegel’s method more seriousness and 
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Nietzsche’s method more clout than 
most thinkers who locate themselves 
in the traditions of Scholasticism, 
phenomenology, analytic and psycho-
analytic and pragmatic philosophy. 
Thus the philosophy expressed in all of 
the articles between the covers of this 
book is very different from anything 
that Brentano or his followers produced 
or spawned, but that is to be expected 
as indicated from the second half of the 
title of this book William Desmond and 
Philosophy after Dialectic.
What, then, can be said of the rest 
of the book, the other 17 chapters? 
Each chapter deserves to be reviewed 
singularly, but both space and time 
prevent that. Yet their genuine 
originality, as well as Desmond’s, needs 
to be noted and evaluated. 
Desmond’s originality is unequivoc-
ally his own, hence the pointless effort, 
thankfully not undertaken by any of 
the contributors, in pointing back to 
which (or to whom?) is the most sig-
ni ficant and determinate historical-
philosophical influence on his thought, 
such as: Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, 
Aquinas, Hegel, Vico, Nietzsche, 
Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger and so 
forth. Instead, each of the contributors 
takes a philosophical issue that either 
provoked or evoked Desmond’s own 
thinking, and takes that thought else-
where, as it were, to a new way of 
read ing, for instance, the actual texts 
of Plato (Leask on Phaedrus, McGuirk 
and Moore on Symposium); or, to  a 
new way of deciphering the signifi-
cance of historical-hermeneutics and 
theological-biblical hermeneutics 
(O’Regan)  in the very generation of 
meaning passed on in our arts, sciences 
and human endeavours, up to and in -
cluding the synaesthetic experiences of 
‘visual music’ (Milbank, p. 231), a term 
not used by Milbank but which captures 
this particular metaxu well; or, to a new 
way of exploring the significance of 
the between that is evidently present 
in ‘light’ in Augustine’s philosophical 
method of interiority, but which is also 
‘in some way a dark mystery [for us 
and to us]’ (Pickstock, p. 119), or the 
significance of Augustine’s meditation 
on and between the ‘inseparable good-
ness of being’ and ‘reflection on this 
goodness’ (Ryan, p. 148); to a new way 
of looking (for Hymers) at the relation-
ship between the three elements of 
‘spontaneous environment’ (nature), 
the ‘constructed environment’ (with 
specific focus on architecture) and 
‘human being,’ but not in dualistic 
terms of ‘ecotecture’ (the architectural 
side of the ‘weak-anthropologism’ of 
ancient Greek and medieval buildings) 
versus the ‘strong anthropocentric 
architecture of Modernity’ (e.g., Le 
Corbusier) that monopolizes (human) 
functionality, but metaxologically, 
such as exhibited, for instance, in Day’s 
‘Ecstatic Architecture’  (pp. 276–277, 
n. 32). Herein, Hymers steps in to 
re-open the debate between deep and 
shal low ecology, without entering into 
or being confined to or by the para-
meters that both of these positions 
circum scribe and relatively stake out 
(i.e., human-centred ethics cannot 
render an adequate basis for an eco-
friendly ethics precisely because they 
are human-centred versus only a non-
human-centred ethics can do justice to 
the responsibility that human beings 
have for nature and that will invariably 
involve building roads, dams, bridges, 
houses, aeroplanes and airport terminals 
etc. through nature). 
Schleiermacher once remarked that 
it is a basic principle of reading a 
text that when one cannot understand 
totally what an author means, one 
should not assume that the author 
is as mad as oneself (to express such 
un intelligibility). This hermeneutic 
principle of ‘generosity’ of the ‘bene-
volent interpreter’ (Sheers, p. 280; 
Kelly, ‘benevolent regard’ p. 5, but 
the allusion to Schleiermacher is 
mine) is applicable, of course, to the 
interpretation of the meaning of any-
thing we do not fully understand in 
our encounters, and not just texts, and 
so, this includes (as Sheers argues) the 
meaning of plant life activity and animal 
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life activity and their modes of being-
in-the-world (to borrow Heidegger’s 
phrase, though, for Heidegger, such 
being-in-the-world is essential only of 
human ‘existence,’ in Heidegger’s sense 
of that term). Thus the application 
of a ‘metaxological hermeneutics’ of 
plants and animals is an especially rich 
place for both the development and 
advancement of Desmond’s thought 
and concern for bearing testimony 
to the value of cultivating ‘agapeic 
minding,’ (p. 283) a central theme of 
Desmond’s philosophy, and a theme 
that invites, directs and teaches one to 
see differently, and so, to see imitatively 
and discriminatively. Thus ‘agapeic 
minding’ is of clear educational value 
to this commentator’s approach.
Perception, nevertheless, is taught, 
a point underscored by and in all phen-
omenological philosophies of present, 
past and future. Plato is no different 
here to Husserl, and vice versa, in their 
recognition of such. And we do have 
to be taught to see ‘being’ differently 
in order to gain perspective on ‘being.’ 
This, I take, is the main point of 
Desmond’s ‘metaxological’ metaphysics. 
The way we both see and receive films 
is taught too, and so, Simpson, in his 
paper ‘All Things Shining: Desmond’s 
Metaxological Metaphysics and The 
Thin Red Line’ sets Desmond’s way of 
seeing the world from a metaxological-
metaphysical point of view to work. 
In this contribution, Simpson prefaces 
his analysis of Malick’s film with a 
clear articulation of some of the main 
principles and themes of Desmond’s 
thought relevant to the film’s content 
(especially Desmond’s reflections on 
life and death) that result in bringing 
out more in both the seeing and hearing 
of the ‘voice overs’ of the film for the 
seer of that disturbing film of senseless 
killing. And yet this contribution sits 
comfortably with a different way of 
seeing things in Smit’s article on ‘A 
World of Value of Cones and Planes,’ 
wherein this author attempts to re-
imagine the topic of ethics and the 
between that lies between system 
and poetics in terms of ‘cones’ and 
‘planes’—again, reconfiguring the way 
to see the ‘agapeic mind’ of charity or 
the ‘trust of charity’ (p. 159), even if 
this issues forth in ‘liabilities that we 
might not be able to discharge’ (ibid.).
Reading is something that is taught 
too. See Leask’s rich hermeneutic-
metaxological analysis of the ‘opening 
question’ of the dialogue put to 
Phaedrus, ‘where are you [are we] 
going and where have you [we] come 
from?’ This topic of Plato’s Phaedrus 
is pre-eminently suited to just such 
a reading—but such a reading has to 
be done by an author, and Leask does 
this exceedingly potently. McGuirk, 
on the other hand, carefully navigates 
Desmond between Nietzsche and 
Plato, but with Plato’s steady eye on 
the Good both as a guide and as a way 
at looking differently on the child, 
Eros, that is, after all, the child of both 
Poros (Resource) and Penia (Poverty) 
in the Symposium. Thus ‘to do justice’ 
to Desmond is to acknowledge, this 
author argues, the venerable insti-
tution of justice that evokes both his 
thought (pp. 164; 169–173) and 
Plato’s thought. To do this, however, 
entails acknowledging the injustices 
per petrated against metaphysics either 
from the outside by ‘a Nietzsche’ or ‘an 
Alcibiades’ (p. 172), or from the inside 
of Hegel’s ‘self-mediated articulation’ 
(ibid). But McGuirk is aware that 
‘[W]hile eros entails a presentiment of 
the Good, . . ., for Plato [my emphasis] 
the Good is always profoundly absent’ 
(ibid.). One cannot but think, then, 
that for Plato, to adapt and paraphrase 
a well-known phrase from Kant, justice 
without goodness is blind, goodness 
without justice, empty. And that is why 
the Good is beyond Being for Plato, but 
not so for Aristotle or for Desmond. 
Thus, Desmond’s attempt to do justice 
to the goodness of being brings us 
away from this author’s concern with 
Plato and back, maybe, to, if not 
Aristotle, certainly to Thomas, and 
to Desmond’s first graduate supervisor, 
Garett Barden. 
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Barden reminds us of the point that 
if the very fact that the world exists is a 
metaphysical question for the thinker—
and its existence not taken as some 
factum brutum of scientific or everyday 
attitude, as Russell, for instance, did 
against Copleston in that famous 
debate in the 1940s, though this is 
not mentioned by this author—it can 
only be a question for that thinker as 
a person of a particular faith, and not 
as a person of science. Thus while it is 
clear to Barden that ‘only the religious 
person can properly be a philosopher of 
religion’ (p. 50, n. 21), it is unclear to 
this reader whether it is his faith in the 
intelligibility of a question demanding 
an answer—and the author is, no 
doubt, entirely correct in pointing out 
that a genuine question that has no 
answer ‘is not properly a question [at 
all]’ (p. 49, n. 20)—or his faith in his 
own philosophico-religious belief in 
the intelligibility of being created out 
of nothing, that renders transcendence 
intel ligible to this author. Coming from 
a similar faith background, Kierkegaard, 
by comparison, advocates, as a matter 
of and for faith, a commitment to the 
absurdity of the existence of the world 
coupled with objective uncertainty in 
the existence of God, a position the 
author appears to rule out (pp. 46–47), 
on the basis of ‘Transcendence and 
Intelligibility,’ the title of his paper. For 
Kierkegaard, nevertheless, what calls 
for (religious) thinking is not so much 
the fact that ‘the existence of the world 
is mysterious’ (p. 47, a wonder that 
can not be, quoting Barrett, ‘injected 
or inculcated p. 49, n.17),’ but the 
in explicable factor that God exists and, 
of perhaps of more critical relevance in 
the interpretation of the significances 
of human life experiences, that God 
loves ‘us.’ Desmond’s position, in 
other words, appears somewhere in the 
between of his former Irish teacher of 
philosophical religion and his adopted 
Danish father of religious philosophy. 
Desmond does remark, at least in 
parentheses: ‘(Is Kierkegaard [qua 
religious thinker] someone to think of 
as showing a way?)’ (p. 30).
That Heidegger did not (in the 
reviewer’s opinion and for reasons 
stated below) show Desmond a 
(positive) way of doing philosophy is, 
of course, a highly debatable issue. Any 
mention of Heidegger, however, and 
a debat able issue is not that far away. 
Nevertheless, Marsh’s article pays 
homage to Desmond’s identification 
(discovery?) of the metaxological 
dimen sion of Being in metaphysical 
re flec tion as an argument against (p. 
104) ‘the overcoming of metaphysics’—
hence the title of his paper ‘William 
Desmond’s Overcoming of the 
Overcoming of Metaphysics,’ where 
that ‘overcoming’ (Überwindung) is to 
be understood as a (Heideggerean or 
Carnapian) duplicitous invocation for 
the  conquering of metaphysics in full 
recognition of the unavoidable and 
inescapable fact of being conquered 
by metaphysics. ‘This argument [never-
theless] gives Desmond a basis in 
experience and reality for evaluating 
one-sided claims such as those made 
by Heidegger and Derrida’ (p. 104). 
Whether this ‘argument’ also puts 
Desmond’s thinking against Levinas’s 
equally one-sided argument for the 
radical priority of the reality of the 
other in our experiencing of the other 
as totally other, as it does in the opinion 
of the author, is doubtful, however, 
to this reader. Levinasian alterity 
is verifiable phenomenologically, 
but such will be considered as some-
thing ‘that cannot be verified phen-
omenologically’ (p. 105) only if 
phenomenology is defined, exclusively, 
by either Husserl or Heidegger. To what 
extent Desmond is a phenomenologist, 
in addition to Levinas, therefore, 
remains unaddressed, but we do know 
that answering this question will, to 
a greater extent, depend upon who it 
is that we take to be defining what 
phenomenology is.
O’Regan thinks ‘Heidegger is a 
consummate thinker of the middle’ 
(p. 69) and that there is ‘a congeniality’ 
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(p. 70) between Heidegger and 
Desmond, especially in Desmond’s Being 
and the Between. Heidegger, no doubt, 
is renowned for his effort in Being and 
Time (1927) ‘to raise anew the question 
of the meaning of Being,’ exclusively in 
relation to the awareness of one’s own 
being (sein) in being and the ‘ontic-
ontological’ priority and significance of 
the concern one expresses about one’s 
own  being (es geht um) in any ‘Being-
question.’ Heidegger (believes that he) 
does this, however, without thinking 
of God and without reference to the 
actual human individual existence 
of others in ‘the Call of Conscience’ 
(O’Regan thinks remnants of ‘cura’ 
reside in Heidegger’s analysis, p. 88, n. 
32, but see Kelly’s comments, p. 5), or, 
indeed, without reference to one’s own 
actual self. Heidegger, then, is right to 
say he is neither an existentialist nor 
a follower of Schleiermacher’s effort 
(very similar to Desmond’s, at least in 
part, but not mentioned in any of the 
contributions) to think the existence of 
the finite together with the existence 
of the infinite. This means, however, 
that Heidegger misappropriates both 
Schleiermacher and Kierkegaard’s 
thought, a point that seems to be over-
looked in the evaluation of Heidegger’s 
early philosophy. This questioning of 
the meaning of being from within the 
particular experience of finitude that 
manifests itself in the mood of Angst 
and in anticipatory awareness of one’s 
own death (and only of one’s own death, 
Vorlaufen zum Tode) is the metaxu, 
nevertheless, of Heidegger’s famous 
pro ject of ‘fundamental ontology,’ 
founded on a ‘hermeneutic of the facti-
city of Dasein (in Heidegger’s sense 
of that term), and that is committed 
to thinking the finite (without the 
infinite) as O’Regan notes (p. 70).’
Identity in terms is not equivalent to 
identity in concepts, however. The way 
Desmond understands ‘the middle’ or 
‘the between’ is qualitatively different 
to the way Heidegger addresses his topic 
in philosophy. In his attempt to think 
being and its meaning both differently 
from and outside of the parameters 
that Heidegger had set a prioristically 
in Being and Time (and in subsequent 
works), Desmond, therefore, presents 
for his reader the possibility that there 
is more, and not less, for philosophy to 
do, than to respond (like puppets) to 
the historical sending of the meaning 
of Being (Heidegger)—therein the re-
opening of philosophy for Desmond 
is also a (necessary) closing shop on 
Heidegger (as it was a necessary closing 
shop for Levinas in the 1930s prior 
to Desmond). O’Regan, nevertheless, 
is correct to situate Desmond (with 
Heidegger) in the broader tradition of 
a philosophical commitment to hermen-
eutics. ‘Properly understood,’ O’Regan 
remarks, ‘the hermeneutic activity of 
philosophy [for Desmond or anyone] 
is a waiting on, a listening to, other 
more compact and symbolically dense 
discourses [he means ‘art and religion,’ 
as is evident from the context, but we 
could add some ‘philosophies’ too, for 
not all philosophies are conducive to 
philosophy of religion as Schleiermacher 
pointed out, and Heidegger’s philosophy 
of Being and Time certainly is not], that 
can be elucidated but not adequately 
translated.’ (p. 73). Given that Vico, 
as O’Regan notes, is closer to Hegel’s 
notion of ‘objective spirit’ (p. 82 [thus 
to Dilthey?]), then the influence of 
Vico—or the suppressed influence 
of Dilthey’s historical-hermeneutic 
flowing through Heidegger into 
Desmond work, minus Heidegger’s 
Kierkegaardian-existentialistic render-
ing of Dilthey’s famous triad of 
Erlebnis-Verstehen-Ausdruck in terms of 
the human being expressing concern 
in what goes about (es geht um) for 
that being’s own individual temporal 
being in being, regardless of the death 
of others, others, time, culture, history, 
art, religion, and even all previous 
philosophy or metaphysics—it is the 
com mitment to a hermeneutic practice 
that echoes through Desmond’s 
alter native (and better) philosophical 
answer to the one that unfurls in 
Heidegger’s ‘path of thinking’ about 
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‘the question of the meaning of Being.’ 
And that is why William Desmond is 
an original thinker, and an original 
thinker of and in ‘metaxological meta-
physics,’ and why his particular style 
(practice) of philosophy cannot be 
imitated or appropriated, as O’Neil 
Surber argues, but, at best, admired 
or, at worse, ignored. It seems to 
me, however, that if the content of 
Desmond’s metaxological philosophy is 
understood to lie between admiration 
and ignorance, then it is not admired 
and misunderstood. It is Desmond’s 
intention that the content of his phil-
osophy is communicable, however 
difficult such communication is for both 
reader and author (see O’Regan, p. 75). 
Thus Desmond’s work is not a defiance 
of logic/dialectic but a defiance of any 
univocal understanding of the logical 
(in the dialectical) as the sole and 
primary criterion of what is thinkable. 
Hence O’Neill-Surber’s attempt to 
think Desmond’s ‘idiotic’ with the 
‘idiodic’ (see parenthetical remarks, 
p. 61) of  the ‘conceptual persona’ of a 
Deleuze and Guattari against Desmond 
may not do what it might claim it 
does (precisely because the concept of 
simi larity implies difference, as well as 
‘commonalities,’ see p. 62), in producing 
a better understanding of Desmond’s 
metaxological philosophy through 
‘cinematics’ more broadly conceived 
as ‘dramaturgics’ (p. 63), rather than 
through ‘poetics’ and ‘singing thought’ 
as Desmond himself argues. 
Differences in identical terms (if 
they are not contingent identities) 
used by philosophers must be 
re spected.  And this is why in his 
contri bution ‘Maybe Not, Maybe: 
William Desmond on God,’ Kearney 
can agree with Desmond’s acute 
observation that ‘A God that needs us 
to be God would be pitiable,’ (p. 196), 
that is to say, pitiable as a God from 
our perspective, but maybe not from 
God’s perspective—God weeps when 
we do terrible things to each other, 
hence the Good that is brought about 
by humans and that we await, when 
absent (such as the experiences of 
the extermination camps) is a pointer 
to a God that desires us to be better 
and in this regard the God that is 
maybe not. Though God did not need 
to create us, God does, as Augustine 
remarks, need us, nevertheless, to fulfil 
creation. With that in mind, the way 
in which the relation of the human 
to the infinite, and that we call God, 
is, without doubt, that which calls 
both Corkonians to think, though that 
relation is, as Kearney acknowledges, 
thought differently by both (p. 200, 
n. 11).
And this is why Chapter 1, the 
editor’s ‘Introduction,’ is so important 
to this work, for, herein the editor 
encapsulates beautifully and most 
elegantly Desmond’s path of thought 
and in thought as a ‘polyphony 
between many really differing, but 
somehow related voices’ (p. 2). The 
editor thanked graciously all those who 
helped him produce this book, and 
noted ‘I couldn’t have done it without 
you’ (p. 9). The book could not have 
been done without Tom either because 
it was his orchestral heart and voice 
that systematically arranged the sing-
ing thoughts of all the contributors into 
this meticulously edited and tightly 
arranged polyphony. And Tom left 
us with just one more added thought, 
being the generous philosopher that he 
was. The jacket cover of the collection 
is a photograph of an oil painting 
entitled ‘As By the Sea Begun’ which 
is one of Tom’s own works of poiesis. 
Between image and text, therefore, 
Tom leaves his trace and his memory 
for which we are truly grateful. Grásta 
Ó Dhía ar a anam.
CYRIL MCDONNELL 
National University of Ireland, 
 Maynooth
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